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Devolution of government power provides many benefits by putting local 
communities more in control of their own destinies.   More local control however 
presents its own set of problems since there are usually externalities associated with local 
decisions.   Economic and sociological influences of municipalities often reach beyond 
their own boundaries as resources and people flow freely with little regard to legal 
boundaries.   Municipalities recognize that there are externalities and cooperate in a 
variety of physical, political, social and economic networks that transcend community 
boundaries, such as streets and highways, water and sewage disposal systems, and 
regional public institutions.  Nevertheless, devolution and the subsequent reduction in 
federal support, restrictive local tax alternatives, and popular opposition to new taxes 
have forced local governments to increase their dependence upon local property and sales 
taxes as their primary sources of revenue.    Where residential or commercial/industrial 
development does not compensate the local government for the cost of providing services 
to an area, the government must either increase the property tax base or the tax rate levied 
on that base to meet service demands. City centers are especially challenged because they 
often have fewer taxable resources relative to the number of people demanding services 
than do the suburbs. When the burden of demands for services become acute, and   2
externalities are high, municipalities often engage in inefficient land development 
patterns sometimes referred to as “sprawl”. 
Local (municipal and county) governments may be motivated to maximize tax 
revenues and, in order to meet community service demands for the least cost, minimize  
demands on government provided services.  Maximizing tax base facilitates the 
revelation of resident preferences for services and provides maximum flexibility and 
opportunity for a municipality to supply those services (Schneider, 1989).  At the same 
time, however, local governments compete with one another to attract commercial and 
industrial business to increase their tax base as well as to nurture a reputation as a center 
for employment and commerce.  The Tiebout model (see Zodrow, 1983 and Schneider, 
1989) showed that competition among municipalities through a market-like institution 
could improve the efficiency of local public good provision by allowing residents to 
“vote with their feet” (also known as "tatonnement") and live in a community that most 
closely approximates their ideal tax/services mix.  Metropolitan “reformers” on the one 
hand and the “polycentrists” on the other have debated issues raised by Tiebout. The 
reformers argue for consolidation of (cooperation among) local governments due to 
potential economies of scale and coordination of services. The polycentrists emphasize 
the efficiency gains by competition among municipalities (Schneider, 1989). Local tax 
competition has lead to piecemeal growth, “over development” of some areas, and 
inadequate public services in others (Lyall, 1975).  Fiscal competition also leads to the 
exploitation of land and open space resources for their short-run tax yield.  
We show here that municipal competition for tax base can lead to an open access 
economic failure from a societal perspective. Taxable base can be seen as a common pool   3
resource because, to municipalities, taxable base is an open access subject to competition 
between municipalities either by acting first or by bidding for potential developments 
with lower tax rates than their neighbors.  Just as it is in the case of private individuals 
competing for open access resources, the competitive solution will be inferior to the 
cooperative solution between two municipalities.  
By casting competition between municipalities for taxable base in a traditional 
open access economic framework, we can formalize the problem of growth and look for 
solutions on familiar and well-trod turf.   We proceed by demonstrating that competition 
for land is an open access problem and then, through a simple game theory example, 
show when cooperation improves welfare.  Among the challenges in the efficient 
management of common pool resources is in creating an appropriate institution for their 
allocation.  We conclude with an example that shows how tax base sharing may provide a 
tool for municipalities to take advantage of potential gains to cooperation by reducing the 
transactions costs of cooperation relative to competition (see, for example, Nunn and 
Rosentraub; Vogt; Reschovsky; McHone; Reschovsky and Knaff; Lyall; and Orfield). 
 
Municipal competition as open access 
The taxable base potentially available to municipalities can be viewed as a 
common pool resource of fixed magnitude. The taxable base or development can be 
managed via some common property management regime or left to mismanagement from 
a regional perspective as an open access resource.  Problems with open access arise from 
free and unrestricted access resulting from lack of ownership of the resource by any 
person or group of people.  When ‘everybody’s property is nobody’s property’ incentives   4
exist for each individual to under-invest in and overexploit resource stocks from a group, 
community or societal perspective. Often de facto property rights to exploit open access 
resources will fall to the party to first able to impose control over it (Bromley, 1991). 
Taxable base demonstrates the requisite characteristics of subtractability (one 
person's use obviates the possibility of another's use) and non-excludability (difficult or 
costly to restrict access to use) for common pool resources.  Just like with private goods, 
once a mushroom greenhouse has located in one municipality, it is no longer an option 
available for other regional municipalities.  However, residents of surrounding 
municipalities will be able to purchase mushrooms as easily as residents of the 
municipality where the greenhouse is located.  Also similar to private goods, it is difficult 
to exclude other municipalities from pursuing taxable base. 
The layers of property rights involved in municipal planning make taxable base a 
unique common pool resource.  Unlike a fishery, for example, land used for taxable base 
like commercial centers or subdivisions is typically privately owned.  The owner holds 
the property rights to guide the use of the land. If landowners behave as economic firms 
(or agents), it can be expected that he will maximize his net financial returns (or utility) 
from the land. However, the degree of individual volition the landowner has and the set 
of opportunities presented regarding the use of his land depend upon the actions of 
neighbors and various layers of government that can influence land use on his property. 
Federal, state, and county government act on behalf of society at each scale to affect 
natural resource management to maximize collective utility. Managing common 
resources toward social objectives potentially attenuates individual property rights. 
Counties and municipalities can determine the level of services to provide to a location.   5
Municipalities can annex and zone land toward the community’s goals, not necessarily 
toward the landowner’s objectives. Although, the municipality may annex and zone a 
property, the change in the municipal tax base is largely dependent upon the willingness 
of private individuals to invest in the property under the rules of the municipality.  
 Typically, open access failures have two components that create inefficient 
resource management; a benefit/cost or appropriation externality and a strategic 
externality (see Steverson, 1991, Gordon, 1954, Ostrom,1994).  These open access 
externalities combine to intensify municipal competition for tax base.  Particularly within 
a nation, social systems, like environmental systems have little respect for most geo-
political boundaries.  In most cases, the negative and positive results of "development" do 
not confine themselves conveniently to one area but will overlap areas of jurisdiction and 
control.  This is the basis for the cost/benefit externality.  The annexing community does 
not capture all costs or benefits of developing taxable base.  For example, increased 
traffic and road costs in adjacent communities whose transportation corridors are used to 
access new taxable base, like a mall.     
Strategic externalities of development also stem from ill-defined property rights.  
The "rule of capture" governs the "ownership" of the resource, also known as the “first in 
place, first in right” property rule. Land not developed or annexed by a municipality may 
be lost to a neighboring community.  The fear that municipalities cannot capture 
tomorrow what they do not develop today undermines their incentive to forgo current 
development for future development (Negri,1989, p. 9).  
  
   6
Non-optimality of open access 
Open access externalities intensify municipal competition for tax base.  Without a 
change of institutions, local governments, acting independently will economically 
overexploit the resource and underinvest in common improvements. Here, the resource is 
land where tax base generating activities can occur.  Municipal competition as a failure of 
open access is illustrated using the “prisoners’ dilemma” two-agent, incomplete 
information game and a simple mathematical example. 
Two neighboring municipalities lie within an economic region. They are adjacent 
(assume transportation costs are not a decision factor), have equivalent fiscal policies,  
and of are approximately equal size and demography (competition for tax base between 
municipalities is unfettered by other factors). Each municipality chooses whether to 
attract more tax base generating activities or not. A municipality will choose to accept the 
costs of development if the increase in tax base compensates for it.  
Each municipality, i, independently maximizes net tax base revenues (NTBRi). 
Municipal net tax base revenues are equivalent to tax base revenues (TBRi) less costs 
(Ci). Both revenues and costs are a function of the amount of taxable base (Yi). 
Arguments in the revenue function include the tax rate implications of zoning and land 
attributes and any positive externalities captured from activities on neighboring lands. 
Arguments in the cost function include infrastructure, annexation, and planning costs and 
any negative externalities associated with the location of the parcel. Total net tax regional 
tax base (NTBR) is the sum of the individual or cooperative net tax base revenue 
maximization decisions made by municipalities within the region. From this framework   7
we can explore the implications of competitive or cooperative behavior among two 
municipalities for tax base as follows: 
 
(1) NTBR= NTBRA + NTBRB; 
(2) NTBRA = TBR(YA) – C(YA) + áATBR(YB) – âAC(YB); 
(3) NTBRB = TBR(YB) – C(YB) + áBTBR(YA) – âBC(YA); 
(4) Y = YA + YB. 
 
In this two-municipality game, the payoff to society is the sum of the net gain in 
the municipality that takes tax base Y, and the fraction of that net payoff that is received 
as an externality benefit, á , or cost, â, in the other municipality.  If neither municipality 
decides to add tax base (Yi = 0) there will be no gain or loss to either and both payoffs are 
zero (Figure 1).  If municipality B does “not add” tax base, municipality A’s decision is 
between  “add” (YA=Y, YB=0), where A will gain TBR(Y) – C(Y) and B will be affected 
by the externality áBTBR(Y) – âBC(Y), and “not add” where A’s gain will be zero 
(Figure 1).   The magnitude of positive externalities associated with B’s proximity to A’s 
development relative to the negative externalities imposed by that development will 
determine whether B is helped or harmed by A’s decision. Reverse payoffs exist if 
Municipality B adds tax base and A does not (Figure 1), although the externality 
parameters may differ across municipalities.  When both municipalities add taxable base, 
their individual payoffs are TBRA (YA) – CA (YA) + áATBRB (YB) – âACB (YB) and TBRB 
(YB) – CB (YB) + áBTBRA (YA) – âBCA (YA), respectively.     8
When one municipality decides not to add tax base the clear optimal decision is 
for the other to add tax base unless the costs of adding is greater than the tax base 
revenue.  If one municipality decides to add tax base the decision for the other is not as 
clear.  Unless the net benefit of the externalities terms (áATBRB(Y) – âACB(Y) - áATBRB 
(YB) – âACB (YB))is greater than the net benefit of securing taxable base by each 
municipality, unilateral securing taxable base  (monopoly) is the preferred solution by 
each municipality and add-add is the dominant solution to the game, since Y is greater 
than either YA or YB if both municipalities choose to  attract tax base.  
 
Figure 1: Incentive to attract tax base: A two-municipality game, with incomplete 
information.
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TBRB (YB) – CB (YB) + áBTBRA(YA) – âBCA(YA) 































áATBRB(Y) – âACB(Y), TBRB(Y) – CB(Y)   0, 0 
a – The first expression in each cell represents municipality “A.”  The expression 
following the comma is for municipality “B.” 
 
The competitive solution (NTBRNC) is only regionally optimal if the 
municipalities are precisely identical in preferences and ability to produce benefits from   9
taxable base. In that case, the competitive solution reduces to the cooperative solution 
(NTBRC) as the externality effects are internalized (áA = áB and âA = âB ) and the cost-
benefit ratio from development in either community is equivalent (TBRA(Y) = TBRB(Y) 
and CA(Y) = CB(Y)). As a result, the cooperative solution is strictly preferred except 
under very specific conditions when the municipalities should be indifferent between the 
two solutions. The competitive and the cooperative solutions are, respectively: 
 
(5) NTBRNC = TBR(YA) – C(YA) + áATBR(YB) – âAC(YB) + TBR(YB) – C(YB) + 
áBTBR(YA) – âBC(YA); 
(6) NTBRC = TBR(YA+B) – C(YA+B). 
 
Alternatively, the problem can be viewed in terms of a model commonly applied 
to fisheries (Hartwick and Olweiler, 1986)).  In an open access situation, each firm 
receives the average value product of the industry’s total effort (see also Gordon, 1954, p 
136 and Stevenson, 1991, p 33).  By harvesting the average value product, each firm 
imposes a cost or externality on every other firm.  Each firm treats the stock (Y), as 
exogenous when the action of firm, i, leads to a lower stock and slightly higher costs for 
every firm. Applied to municipalities: 
 
(7) TBR = AVPYY, 
 
TBR is municipal tax base revenue, which is a function of taxable base, Y.  Tax base 
revenue equals the average value product (AVP), or average tax rate, of taxable base   10
multiplied by the amount of tax base developed. By differentiating this equation with 
respect to the marginal change in taxable base, we can look at the impact a marginal 
increase in taxable base from the development of an additional lot on tax base revenue. 
  
(8) dTBR/dY = AVPY + Y(dAVPY/dY). 
 
The term dTBR/dY can be interpreted as the marginal value product of taxable base 
which equals the average value product of taxable base plus the term Y(dAVPY/dY).  
This term shows the change in the revenue from tax base per unit of tax base due to the 
development of an additional unit of taxable base.  The term is negative because current 
development reduces the amount of taxable base available in the future.   Development 
also limits what can be done with the remaining land.  Once a regional mall is developed, 
not only is that land use decision irreversible (for certain land uses with varying time 
horizons), but the set of potentially optimal land use alternatives for surrounding parcels 
is limited by the decision.   All regional municipalities in the region are affected by the 
marginal change in taxable base. 
In this example, each municipality ignores the term Y(dAPY/dY) in making its own 
land use decisions. It cannot enter into consideration for future land use planning 
alternatives because that tax base is not under the current control of the municipality and 
there is no reason to be certain that it will be. It is a portion of the cost externality 
previously described in the game theoretic example or what Hartwick and Olweiler call 
the stock effect since it affects the stock of taxable base.  For each increment in taxable 
base, municipalities actually receive the industry average value product of effort minus   11
the stock effect.  But because all municipalities feel the stock effect, no single one takes it 
into account when deciding how much taxable base to use. The municipalities ignore the 
effect an increase in development of tax base has on taxable base of the region and hence 
on the tax base revenue. The stock effect is ignored in the open access equilibrium, and 
this is the economic inefficiency induced by individual competitive behavior. (Hartwick 
and Olweiler, 1986). 
 
Tax Base Sharing:  An Optimal and Cooperative Solution  
  Property rights defining the rules of access, use and management of the resource 
base are required to prevent the "tragedy of open access". Six neoclassical economic 
solutions to open access have been suggested: privatization, input quotas, input rights, 
output quotas, output rights, and taxation (Steverson, 1991).   A discussion about all of 
these neoclassical prescriptions to open access problems is beyond the scope of this 
study.   We will focus on tax-base sharing or revenue sharing as a tool to provide 
incentives for local governments to cooperate. 
Tax base sharing typically has been used to help alleviate fiscal disparities 
between municipalities within a metropolitan area.  Tax base, tied to higher income 
properties and industry, have often left the central cities in search of lower land prices 
and to escape the perceived "social problems".  This exodus to the suburbs usually leaves 
behind the groups of people who tend to place high demands on the local public sector, 
for instance, the poor and the aged (Reschovshy and Knaff, 1977).  Many suburbs also 
face this problem of misallocation of resources due to the absence of commercial and 
industrial businesses in which they can levy taxes.  Commonly, residential areas are a net   12
draw on resources and commercial and industrial developments are a net gain to local 
resources. 
Tax base sharing has had multiple goals:  
• Improve horizontal equity (fiscal disparity and mobility constraints); 
• Stimulate more efficient patterns of metropolitan area development (production at the 
lowest social cost) (Reschovsky and Knaff ,1977), and  
• Improve tax equity (receiving benefits of growth while only bearing a small fraction 
of the infrastructure cost needed to attract that growth) (Vogt, 1979). 
Tax-base sharing could be a method of creating an institutional structure whereby 
making taxable base a well managed, common pool resource by reducing the incentives 
for non-optimal land development by individual municipalities and potentially providing 
greater incentives for the provision of other, less lucrative, regional benefits of land 
including open space, for example.  With tax base sharing, local governments may 
strengthen their fiscal capacity to respond to local public service demands including 
demands for more rational land development, open space and environmental preservation 
(Lyall, 1975). 
Tax base sharing usually has two parts; a formula for determining the contribution 
to the ‘growth pool’; and a formula for determining the shares paid out of the pool each 
year.  The pool does not accumulate.  Payments into the pool are determined by applying 
the average commercial tax rate for the region to a certain percent of the difference in the 
assessed value of all commercial and industrial property within its boundaries between 
that year and the base year.  Only communities that experience growth in tax base 
contribute to the pool but all governments in the region share in the distribution of the   13
pool.  Those participating in the plan determine the formula for determining shares paid 
out.  In Minneapolis-Saint Paul, Minnesota, for example, the value of each government’s 
share of the area wide base is determined by each community’s population and inversely 
related to the size of its fiscal capacity (the market value of all property, both residential 
and non-residential)(Reschovsky and Knaff, 1977).   These formulae vary between plans.  
In San Diego, California, the share received varied directly with population size and 
inversely with the value of residential property value per capita  (Vogt, 1979). 
Adding tax base sharing to the prisoner’s dilemma example leads to different 
results. The net benefit to municipality A for developing taxable base is shown in 
Equation 9.  The tax revenue for a municipality is a function of the taxable base in year t, 
Yit multiplied by the tax rate Ti, as shown in Equation 10.   If tax base sharing were 
implemented, tax revenue would be subject to both contributing to and receiving from a 
“growth pool” of tax base. YAt – Ybase would be used to determine the change in taxable 
base between the base year and current year. Ybase is the base year taxable base and TTBS 
is the tax base sharing tax rate, often an average regional rate.  Additionally, there are tax 
base sharing “shares” that each community could receive which is determined by the size 
of the regional tax base pool and their share ratio, TBPOOL*Si. The share contributed 
and received from the pool are both assumed to be zero or greater.  The tax base revenue 
is now represented as Equation 11.   
(9) NTBRA = TBR(YA) – C(YA) + áATBR(YB) – âAC(YB); 
(10) TBR(YA) = YAt * TA 
(11) TBR(YA) = YAt * TA – ((YAt – Ybase) * TTBS) + TBPOOL*SA.   14
Figure 2: Incentive to attract tax base: A two-municipality game, with incomplete 
information and tax base sharing 
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YBt TB – ((YBt – Ybase) TTBS ) – C(YB) 
0,0 
 
In the tax base sharing, two-municipality game, if neither municipality decides to 
add tax base (Yi = 0) there will be no gain or loss to either and both payoffs are zero 
(Figure 2).  For municipality A, if municipality B decides to add tax base, its payoff 
decision is between: 
YAt * TA – ((YAt – Ybase) * TTBS )+ TBPOOLA+B*SA – C(YA) + áATBRB(YB) – 
âACB(YB), andTBPOOLB*SA + áATBRB(Y) – âACB(YA is faced with determining 
whether their net tax base revenue   is greater than the net benefit of the externalities 
terms (áATBRB(Y) – âACB(Y) - áATBRB (YB) – âACB (YB)) plus their share of the tax 
base pool only contributed by B. .   Unless it was a low profit project net tax base 
revenues should be greater than zero.  What is uncertain is the size of their share of the 
pool only contributed by B and the net benefit/cost of the externalities.   Tax base sharing 
creates a mechanism for internalizing the cost/benefit externalities of open access as well   15
as addresses the strategic externalities.  Reducing the benefits of land development and 
increasing the benefits of providing open space or parks for example may provide enough 
incentive to work toward more rational land use patterns.  Comparing the tax base 
sharing payoff and the original payoff for A if both municipalities develop, results in 
equations 12 and 13 respectively.  The benefits of developing were greater and the costs 
smaller without tax base sharing. The size of the tax base share contributed and received 
depends on each project and the how the tax base is growing for the entire region. 
(12) YAt TA – ((YAt – Ybase) TTBS ) + TBPOOLSA – C(YA) + áATBRB(YB) – âACB(YB); 
(13)  YAt TA – CA(YA) + áATBRB (YB) – âACB (YB); 
The share of the tax base pool received helps to offset the costs, âACB(YB), that B’s 
development imposes on A  but the relative size of the share received and costs are 
uncertain.  However, in this two person game, if A decides not to develop, the tax base 
pool share it receives is a direct transfer from what B pays into the pool and in this way, 
tax base sharing provides a mechanism for internalizing the cost externality of open 
access.   
 The payoff decision for municipality A if B decides not to develop is between: 
YAt TA – ((YAt – Ybase) TTBS ) – C(YA) and 0. In most cases, net tax base revenue minus 
their tax base contributed share will be greater than zero unless it was a low profit 
development.  The decision for player A if B decides not to develop without tax base 
sharing is YAt TA  – CA(YA) and 0.   Under tax base sharing, the benefit of strategic 
development is diminished. 
Unless the expected share of the tax base pool only contributed to by one 
municipality plus the net benefits of the externality terms (áATBRB(Y) – âACB(Y) -   16
áATBRB (YB) – âACB (YB)) is greater than the net benefit of securing taxable base by 
each municipality, unilateral securing of taxable base, add-add, is again the dominant 
solution to the game. However, the difference between the payoffs is diminished with tax 
base sharing and in those cases where the benefits are low and costs are high for a 
development, not adding and accepting the transfer of tax base would become the 
dominant strategy.  Tax base sharing primarily responds to the cost/benefit externality 
and strategic externality of open access failures by requiring participating communities to 
contribute to and receive from a tax base pool and by reducing the benefits of 
development and increasing the costs. 
 
Conclusion 
 Regional and municipal planners face open access problems with unique levels of 
rights and complex sets of objectives and circumstances. Addressing tax base competition 
in an open access framework provides opportunities for better understanding the problem 
as well as an opportunity to build off a significant amount of research for potential 
solutions.  Areas for further study include analyzing instruments other than tax base 
sharing that address the open access failure of seeking taxable base and analyzing the 
incentives of municipalities to cooperate depending on their relative “power”.  
Additionally, the model can be complicated to take into account land use objectives other 
than tax revenue maximization. Since some of these objectives could be at cross 
purposes, depending on the perspective of the land user, the payoff matrix becomes more 
complicated and the optimal solution (the mix of objectives meeting goods and services) 
is less intuitively obvious.   17
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